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CHAPTER 14 
Zoning and Land Use 
RICHARD G. HUBER 
A. DECISIONS 
§14.1. Zoning: Variances. Previous volumes of the ANNUAL SURVEY 
have commented on the requirement of the Supreme Judicial Court 
that boards of appeal comply strictly with the statute l in granting 
variances.2 This strict attitude is essential if zoning is to be an effec-
tive means of land use planning. Local boards, because of pressure, 
competing policy, and perhaps occasionally inexperience, often grant 
variances readily without fully realizing that the confidence of land-
owners and land-users in the integrity of zoning is a first concomitant 
to the development of land use in a certain area in accordance with 
the land use plan of the community. The Court's strict insistence on 
full statutory compliance is important not so much to rectify errors of 
the boards and trial courts but particularly to furnish a guide to boards 
and courts in the many variance cases in which there is no appeal taken 
to the Supreme Judicial Court. 
The Supreme Judicial Court decided four variance cases during the 
1958 SURVEY year. In two of the cases the Court upheld the granting of 
variances on facts that are nearly classic examples of situations which 
the power to grant variances is meant to cover. Rodenstein v. Board 
RICHARD G. HUBER. is Associate Professor of Law at Boston College Law School 
and Editor in Chief of the ANNUAL SURVEY. He was formerly editor of the Iowa 
Law Review and the Tulane Law Review. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance furnished him by 
Francis J. Pavetti, Allan B. Soloman and William A. Cotter, Jr. of the Board of 
Student Editors of the ANNUAL SURVEY. 
§14.1. 1 General Laws, c. 40A, §15(3), before the 1958 amendment, stated: "To 
authorize upon appeal, or upon petition in cases where a particular use is sought 
for which no permit is required, with respect to a particular parcel of land or to 
an existing building thereon a variance from the terms of the applicable zoning 
ordinance or by-law where, owing to conditions especially affecting such parcel or 
such building but not affecting generally the zoning district in which it is located, 
a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance or by-law would involve 
substantial hardship to the appellant, and where desirable relief may be granted 
without substantial detriment to the public good and without nullifying or sub-
stantially derogating from the intent or purpose of such ordinance or by-law, but 
not otherwise." For a discussion of the amendment to this section by Acts of 1958, 
c. 381, see §14.9 infra. 
21957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§11.2. 29.6; 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1.2. 
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of Appeal of Boston8 permitted the use of part of a lot in a residential 
district 4 for parking for hire, subject to a number of conditions. I> The 
greater part of the entire lot had been the subject of two earlier vari-
ances which permitted its use for a gasoline filling station and 
allowed the parking of vehicles on which work was being done at the 
station. There was evidence that the entire lot had heavy rock forma-
tions immediately under the topsoil and for that reason an apartment 
building could not now be built economically on the land. The lot 
faced two heavily traveled thoroughfares and there were a number of 
apartment houses in the vicinity that had no garages or other parking 
facilities. The Court accepted the trial court's determinations that 
this land could not be used for purposes permitted in the zone in 
which it was located and that the use of the land for parking would be 
a benefit to nearby residents without injuriously affecting the resi-
dential character of the neighborhood. In the words of the Court, "the 
use sought in the instant case was of small consequence," because it 
only slightly altered the previous use of the land under the earlier 
variances. 
On the facts of this case we might object to the granting of the 
earlier variances permitting the filling station and attendant parking. 
At the time the original variance was granted in 1944, or as soon there-
after as wartime building restrictions were removed, it may well have 
been economically feasible to build an apartment house on this lot. 
The original variances, however, were subject to restrictions that 
tended to prevent the variances from detracting from the neighbor-
hood as a residential area, and certainly the presence of heavy rock 
formations immediately under the topsoil would at least discourage 
any building; the lot in 1944 was, in fact, an unsightly vacant, lot. But 
the earlier variances were established at the time this case came before 
the Court and thus the additional variance made only an apparent, not 
a real, change in the use of the land, and at the same time provided for 
parking in a congested residential area where such parking was at least 
desirable. 
Kairis v. Board of Appeal of Cambridge6 was the second case in 
which the Supreme Judicial Court approved the granting of a variance. 
The owner of the lot involved sought permission to use the property 
for a filling station. The property was zoned for business but the zone 
excluded filling stations, although it permitted the closely akin use of 
garages. The building on the property had room for businesses on 
the ground floor and "cold water flats" on the second and third floors. 
The building was found to be structurally unsound and over half of 
81958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 599, 149 N.E.2d 382. For a discussion of the review pro-
cedure aspects of this case. see §13.5 supra. 
4 The district was zoned for general residential use with a 65 foot height limita-
tion. Record. p. 2. 
I> The conditions are set out in the Opinion of the Court at 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
599,601,149 N.E.2d 382, 384. 
61958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 813, 150 N.E.2d 278. 
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the flats were vacant. Two filling stations were already in operation 
as non-conforming uses in the near vicinity of this property and a num-
ber of other non-conforming uses existed nearby. There was also 
evidence that the present building constituted a "blind corner" at a 
busy intersection and that it may, at least in part, have been a hazard 
accounting for traffic accidents at this corner. The Court also accepted 
the lower court's determination that this area was largely commercial 
with a distinct trend toward becoming completely commercial. 
The variance granted in the Kairis case permitted a use only slightly 
different from that permitted by the zoning by-law and also removed a 
traffic hazard. The result is certainly supportable on the facts as found 
by the Superior Court. Testimony in the case indicated, however, that 
there are a number of non-conforming uses in this vicinity and at least 
one variance had been granted recently that extended a non-conform-
ing use. There is an uncontroverted finding of fact that the zoned 
area is shifting from partly to completely commercial, and evidence 
was adduced that very little residential use of property exists in this 
area any longer. Under these circumstances the city should consider 
an amendment to its zoning by-laws to make this district more un-
restrictedly commercial, if that is considered the best use of the land. 
If the city desires to retain its present zoning, every effort should be 
made to reduce non-conforming uses and to prevent the granting of 
any variances. Certainly at present it is unlikely that anyone owning 
land in this district would consider constructing new buildings or even 
substantially improving older buildings for any other purposes than 
commercial ones, since the area is more extensively commercial in 
nature than the present zoning law permits. 
In the other two variance cases decided by the Supreme Judicial 
Court during the 1958 SURVEY year, the Court refused to uphold de-
cisions of boards of appeal granting variances. Todd v. Board of Ap-
peals of Yarmouth 7 involved a variance to use land in a residential 
district for boat rentals, sales, service and storage. Prior to the adop-
tion of the zoning ordinance the land had been used for some types of 
boat rentals and the sale of fish. In 1954 and 1955 the board of appeals 
of the town had granted the then owner "permits" 8 to run a boat 
rental service and to repair his own boats, and provided that these 
permits would run only to the applicant and not with the property. 
The present owner, after purchase of the land, sought what he desig-
nated as a "permit," which the Superior Court and the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court found to be more extensive than the permit given to the 
previous owner. The Court found that the present owner was really 
seeking a variance and held that the facts as found by the Superior 
Court did not permit the granting of the variance requested. 
The decision of the board of appeals and the briefs of the parties 
71958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 411,148 N.E.2d 380. 
8 The Court decided that the action of the board of appeals in 1955 was the 
grant of a "permit" and not a "variance," despite conflicting wording. 1958 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 415, 148 N.E.2d at 384-385. 
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indicate that considerable confusion existed as to exactly what section 
of the zoning law applied, i.e., whether what was sought by the land-
owner was a mere change in non-conforming use, a permit under a 
permissible exception, or a variance. Substantially different standards 
apply in each situation9 and the result in this case depended on which 
type of use was involved. The board apparently decided the case as a 
non-conforming use situation,10 but the Supreme Judicial Court rather 
summarily disposed of this argument since it appeared that no com-
mercial use of the land at the time of the adoption of the zoning ordi-
nance was permissible under the zoning by-law. It was argued, how-
ever, that the use of the previous landowner under the 1954 and 1955 
action of the board would run with the land and was the same as here 
sought by the present owner. The Court found these actions were no 
more than the granting of a personal permit to the previous landowner 
as a permissible exception. But the present case was held to involve a 
variance, not a permit, since the use sought, being somewhat more ex-
tensively commercial than that covered by the previous permits, was 
clearly not a permissible exception under the zoning ordinance. The 
present case points out that the distinctions among permissible changes 
in non-conforming uses, permits for exceptions, and variances are often 
close and difficult to determine. The decision will provide some aid to 
boards of appeals and attorneys for landowners in analyzing these close 
situations. 
In Vainas v. Board of Appeals of Lynn}! a variance was granted by 
the board to permit the landowner to construct a dormer on one-half 
of the third floor of a two and one-half story building located in an 
apartment zone. This change would permit an additional bedroom 
and closets in the third floor apartment. An earlier variance in 1950 
had permitted, among other items, a dormer on the other one-half of 
the building which had first made it possible to use the third floor for 
an apartment. The use and condition of the building was non-con-
forming in a number of respects. There were a number of three-story 
multiple-family dwellings in the vicinity and much of the property, in-
cluding that of the plaintiff here suing as a party aggrieved, was non-
conforming in one or more ways.12 The Superior Court reversed the 
board on the ground that the owner would suffer no "substantial hard-
ship" within the meaning of the variance statutory provisions, since he 
would only gain an apartment that would be somewhat easier to rent 
and would rent at a higher price. This finding was held by the Su-
preme Judicial Court to be fatal to the landowner's case. 
The Vainas case illustrates one of the more difficult problems facing 
9 C.L., c. 40A, §§4, 15(2) (permits); id. §§5, II (changes in non-conforming use). 
101958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 4II, 415, 148 N.E.2d 380, 383. 
11 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 895, 150 N.E.2d 721. 
12 The Court held that a non·conforming user can be a person aggrieved under 
C.L., c. 40A, §21, citing Reynolds v. Board of Appeals of Springfield, 335 Mass. 464, 
470, 140 N.E.2d 491, 496 (1957), discussed in 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.2. 1958 
Mass. Adv. Sh .. 895, 897, 150 N.E.2d 721, 722-723. 
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boards of appeals. It can be gathered from the record and briefs that 
this neighborhood was partly depressed and blighted and that the 
earlier variance on this property was granted because the building was 
old and dilapidated and the owner, who had just purchased it, in-
tended to improve it substantially if he could get adequate income 
from it.13 Many sections of Massachusetts cities consist of older run-
down buildings that would be repaired if an adequate income were 
assured, whereas it is unlikely that any individual owner would con-
sider constructing new buildings in the area because of the general 
character of the neighborhood. The pressure on zoning boards, as is 
illustrated in the Vainas case, to go along with any repairs and im-
provements is great, even if it requires the granting of a variance or 
the expansion of a non-conforming use. But the easy granting of these 
requests by boards destroys the effectiveness of zoning systems. The 
Lynn zoning ordinance was adopted over thirty years ago and, at least 
in the neighborhood in which the building here involved is located, 
there seems to be no substantial decrease in non-conforming uses and 
variances have been given relatively readily. Thus it would appear 
that this area is now less close to the zoning ordinance ideal than it 
was thirty years ago. In time, of course, the area might be a proper 
subject for an urban redevelopment project, but in the meantime the 
board must try to balance two opposing factors, the zoning plan on the 
one hand and the need for repair and improvement on the other. As 
the opinion in the Vainas case illustrates, the best ways to balance 
these conflicting interests are either by strict application of the statu-
tory standards for variations or, if change in the neighborhood requires 
it, by amending the zoning ordinance to place this area in a zone in 
which it more properly belongs. 
§14.2. Zoning: Amendment to zoning by-laws. The Supreme Ju-
dicial Court has always given more deference to local determination in 
cases of amendments to zoning by-laws and ordinances than it has in 
cases of variances.1 Some amendments have, of course, been rejected 
as spot zoning or because the statutory authority of the municipal body 
extending or changing zoning districts was exceeded. Despite this 
attitude of judicial deference, the Supreme Judicial Court denied the 
validity of changes in zoning districts and uses in two of the three such 
cases that came before it during the 1958 SURVEY year. The cases are, 
however, routine in nature and in the two cases wherein zoning 
changes were not approved, the changes involved spot zoning. 
In 1956 the Supreme Judicial Court, in Atherton v. Board of Appeals 
of Bourne,2 annulled a variance granted by the board to one Bigelow 
to permit his using certain property for the building, repair and 
13 Record, pp. 10,20; Defendant's Brief, p. 1. 
§14.2. 1 Compare Cohen v. Lynn, 333 Mass. 699, 705, 132 N.E.2d 664, 668 (1956), 
with Blackman v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 334 Mass. 446, 449-450, 136 
N.E.2d 198,200 (1956). See comment in 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1.2. 
2334 Mass. 451, 136 N.E.2d 201 (1956), commented on in 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §§1.2, 13.2. 
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storage of boats. The town then amended its zoning by-law to change 
the Bigelow property and six contiguous parcels from residential dis-
trict to general use district. In Atherton v. Selectmen of Bourne,S 
mandamus was brought by various owners of near-by land, including 
three of the owners of parcels that had been rezoned, to require the 
town authorities to enforce the zoning law as it existed prior to the 
amendment. The Supreme Judicial Court concurred in the finding of 
the Superior Court that the amendment was invalid. The Zoning En-
abling Act requires that areas of substantially the same character must 
have the same zoning regulations and that the purpose of zoning in-
cludes conservation of the value of property and the encouragement of 
the most appropriate use of the land.4 The entire tract of land here 
involved, of which the rezoned area was a relatively small part, was 
basically similar in character and nature.5 The rezoning was also held 
to lessen land values and to discourage the most appropriate use, which 
was residential. Clearly the rezoning of the Bigelow land alone would 
have been spot zoning and the Court held that the mere inclusion of 
six additional lots in the rezoned area did not remove the case from 
one of spot zoning. While the area rezoned was fairly large geo-
graphically, being in the vicinity of six or seven acres, the Court is 
certainly correct in designating this spot zoning; the area rezoned was 
clearly a part of a larger tract with the same general characteristics.6 
In Pierce v. Town of Wellesley,7 the Supreme Judicial Court was 
more sympathetic to an amendment of a zoning by-law. The Wellesley 
by-law had contained a provision that land in single residence districts 
could be used for "public school or other public use." In the case of 
Berger v. Wellesley8 the Superior Court had held that "other public 
use" did not include a municipally operated parking lot; the Supreme 
Judicial Court did not decide this point since the case was dismissed as 
moot because of the adoption of the amendment now presented in the 
Pierce case. The amendment inserted the additional phrase "mu-
nicipally owned or operated parking lot" as a permissible use. The 
two cases and the activities related primarily to one plot of land, 
owned by a Mrs. Fraser, who also owned substantial business property 
in the Wellesley Square area. At least one of Mrs. Fraser's business 
tenants had indicated that it might not renew its lease because of in-
adequate nearby parking facilities. Mrs. Fraser's husband was a mem-
ber of the Wellesley planning board and was largely instrumental in 
arranging the original lease, declared not permissible by the Superior 
S 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 511, 149 N.E.2d 232. See further comment on this case in 
§19.l infra. 
4 G.L.. c. 40A. §§2-3. 
5 In Atherton v. Board of Appeals of Bourne. 334 Mass. 451, 454. 136 N.E.2d 201. 
203 (1956). the Court had described this entire area as "a homogeneous unit for 
zoning purposes. Indeed. it would be difficult to conceive of one that was more so." 
6 Atherton v. Selectmen of Bourne also decided that mandamus would lie. This 
point is discussed in §14.5 infra. 
7336 Mass. 517. 146 N.E.2d 666 (1957). This case is also discussed in §19.1 infra. 
8334 Mass. 193,134 N.E.2d 436 (1956). 
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Court in the Berger case, and the subsequent amendment which is be-
fore the Supreme Judicial Court in the present case. Much of the 
present controversy relates to the Fraser parking lot proposal but the 
attack was necessarily that the amendment was generally invalid. As 
the Court states, this requires that persons attacking the amendment 
show that it conflicts either with the provisions of the enabling act or 
with constitutional provisions on the grounds that there is no sub-
stantial relation between the amendment and the furtherance of any 
of the general objects of the zoning law.9 The Court sustained the 
Land Court's determination that these burdens had not been met. It 
was a reasonable conclusion of the town meeting that parking and 
traffic problems could be solved by way of the amendment. Since off-
street parking is a public purpose, a generally applicable, non-dis-
criminatory zoning by-law is valid although it may be detrimental to 
some property. 
One point of basically novel impression in the Commonwealth was 
decided in the Pierce case. The amendment limits parking lots in 
single residence zones to those that are municipally operated or owned. 
It was argued that this special exception for the town violated the gen-
eral principle that a municipality must comply with its own zoning 
laws. The simple answer, of course, is that the amendment itself per-
mits the town to do this and, while alternative methods of controlling 
the development of parking lots in single residence districts might have 
been used by the town, the present method requiring town operation 
was a permissible control provision. The Court suggests that, had the 
provision for parking lots been a purely private business venture of 
the town, the result might have been different. But provisions for 
parking lots to relieve public needs are not private business ventures 
of a town and thus the town may permit itself to use land in certain 
ways that it need not permit private citizens to do. The mere fact that 
the town may lease and operate the lot, rather than own it outright, 
does not change this result; the town as lessee may well have rights in 
performing a quasi-governmental activity that the lessor would not 
have. 
McHugh v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of BostonlO arose under the 
zoning law for the city of Bostonll rather than the general zoning law 
of the Commonwealth.12 Under this law the board of zoning adjust-
ment has the power to change the boundaries of zoning districts if 
certain criteria are met.1S The property involved was contiguous to a 
9336 Mass. 517,521,146 N.E.2d 666, 669 (1957). 
10336 Mass. 682, 147 N.E.2d 761 (1958). 
11 Acts of 1924, c. 488. This zoning law is in the process of being replaced by· 
Acts of 1956, c. 665. See §14.12 infra, note 2. 
12 G.L., c. 40A. 
13 Acts of 1924, c. 488, §20 states the criteria as follows: "Either upon petition or 
otherwise, the board may, subject to the following conditions, change the boundaries 
of districts ... [1] to meet altered needs of a locality, [2] to avoid undue concen-
tration of population, [3] to provide adequate light and air, [4] to lessen congestion 
in streets, [5] to secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers, [6] to facilitate 
7
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general business district but was zoned for general residence. The 
board changed the zoning to general business which had the effect of 
increasing the depth of the zone, which was established at one hun-
dred feet on the streets involved, to one hundred and seventy feet on 
one street and one hundred and fifty feet on the other. The purpose 
was to permit the use of the land as a truck terminal in connection with 
the business conducted on the adjoining part of the owner's property 
that was already zoned for business. The Court held this was spot 
zoning on its face and reversed the board and the Superior Court. 
The board had found that the rezoning met two of the criteria of the 
statute under which it operates, i.e., it met altered needs of the locality 
and it promoted the health, safety, convenience and welfare of the in-
habitants of Boston. The Supreme Judicial Court did not necessarily 
dispute the findings of fact by the board which caused it to find these 
two criteria were met but did find that the findings were, even if cor-
rect, generally applicable to all of the surrounding land, not just to 
this one small area,14 Although the Boston zoning law does not ex-
pressly forbid spot zoning, as does the general zoning law, the Court 
held that uniformity of classification is essential to prevent arbitrary 
action in zoning. And, as the Court states, "There can be no presump-
tion of the validity of legislative action which is expressly predicated 
only on facts which if true establish the invalidity of what is done." 15 
§14.3. Zoning: Accessory and non-conforming uses. Three de-
cisions of the Supreme Judicial Court during the 1958 SURVEY year 
dealt with problems of accessory and non-conforming uses. In Todd 
v. Board of Appeals of Yarmouth1 the board of appeals decided the 
case as a non-conforming use but the Supreme Judicial Court held that 
it was a variance case. This case is discussed elsewhere in this chap-
ter.2 In the other two cases the Court decided that the uses sought to 
be made of the property were neither permissible non-conforming uses 
nor proper accessory uses. 
the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage and other public require-
ments and [7] to promote the health, safety, convenience and welfare of the inhabi-
tants of the city of Boston. Such changes shall be made with reasonable considera-
tion, among other things, of the character of the district and its peculiar suitability 
for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and en-
couraging the most appropriate use of land ... " The criteria to be applied by 
the new zoning law of the city of Boston are set out in Acts of 1956, c. 665, §2. 
They include criteria [2]-[5] of the 1924 criteria, add "ScllOOls and parks" to criteria 
number [6], and add the following additional criteria: "to conserve health; ... to 
prevent overcrowding of land; ... to conserve the value of land and buildings; to 
encourage the most appropriate use of land throughout the city; and to preserve 
and increase its amenities." 
14 336 Mass. 682,688, 147 N.E.2d 761, 765. 
111336 Mass. at 690, 147 N.E.2d at 767. The petitioners in this case also argued 
that the decision of the Board of Zoning Adjustment was invalid for lack of partic-
ipation of the requisite number of its members. The part of the opinion of the 
Court rejecting this contention is discussed in §14.7 infra. 
§14.3. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 411,148 N.E.2d 380. 
2 See §14.1 supra. 
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City of Haverhill v. DiBurr03 involved the use of a dining room of 
a boarding house property for large banquets and parties. The city 
had adopted a new zoning ordinance in 1956 which would make this 
use of the property invalid unless "such use was not in violation of the 
zoning regulation in effect at the time of the effective date" of the ordi-
nance.4 The 1941 zoning law therefore controlled and, under it, the 
property was partly in "A" residential district and partly in "C" resi-
dential district. HA" district permitted board and room establishments 
and hotels, clubs, and other public buildings except those conducted as 
a business. HC" district permitted commercial operation of hotels and 
apartment buildings "and provided that a public restaurant or dining 
room shall be allowed only as an accessory use in such building." 5 
The master decided that the building could not be considered as two 
separate units and that therefore the conducting of the banquet busi-
ness violated the HA" district requirements; he also found, however, 
that the banquet business was not such an accessory use as would be 
permitted in a HC" district.6 The Superior Court decree enjoined the 
use of the part of the building in "A" district for the commercial 
banquet business and that part in "C" district for the banquet business 
except as it was an accessory use in a three room tourist home.7 The 
Supreme Judicial Court essentially rejected the theory of both the 
master and Superior Court and enjoined any use of the property for 
the banquet and party business? whether or not refreshments were 
served, as it held as a matter of law that none of the dining uses made 
of the property were proper accessory uses under the zoning ordinance. 8 
In Mioduszewski v. Town of Saugus9 certain landowners sought a 
determination of the validity and effect of the town zoning by-law as 
applied to certain property. This property was zoned residential un-
der the 1929 zoning by-law, which permitted as uses farms and truck 
gardens and such accessory uses as are customarily incidental to the 
activity permitted as long as they do not injure the neighborhood and 
alter the character of the premises. The owners were conducting a 
dairy business on the land at the time the zoning by-law was adopted 
and in conjunction therewith also bred five beagles and two other dogs 
and sold or gave away the puppies. The dog breeding apparently 
stopped in 1941, although the land was used to raise dairy cattle until 
1947. Between 1947 and 1952 a dairy business was conducted on the 
premises but milk was brought in from other sources. Starting in 1945 
a greyhound racing stable was started on the premises and from 1952 
until the present that was the only use made of the land. The owner 
claimed that zoning all of his property in a residential district was 
illegal spot zoning since it could not be satisfactorily cut up into 
31958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 481, 148 N.E.2d 642. 
4 Record, p. 14. 
Ii Id., p. 10. 
6 Id., pp. 13·14. 
7 Id., p. 23. 
8 The Court also discussed the status of aggrieved landowners as intervenors in 
this case. This point is discussed in §14.6 infra. 
91958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 385, 148 N.E.2d 655. 
9
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residential lots of the usual size.10 The Court, however, found that 
the premises could as presently constituted still be used for the per-
mitted use of a farm and also accepted the finding of the Land Court 
that the surrounding area was residential in character and all of the 
rear of the property here involved could be used as accessory to dwell-
ings. 
The Supreme Judicial Court had to decide a narrow point of novel 
impression in the Commonwealth in determining if a greyhound 
racing stable could properly be considered a farm under the by-law. 
The by-law itself did not define the term. But Lincoln v. Murphyll 
had held that a commercial piggery not connected with other farming 
operations was not a farm under the zoning by-law, and the Court cited 
several cases from other jurisdictions supporting its view that this was 
not a farm.12 It is interesting to note, in relation to this argument of 
the Court, that it did not even mention the argument of the landowner 
in this case that the conducting of a dairy business at the time of the 
adoption of the zoning by-law was a non-conforming use because it 
could not properly be considered to be farming.13 The Court did 
hold, however, that the use of this land for a greyhound racing stable 
was not a permissible non-conforming use since it was a radically 
different use from the simple, casual breeding of a few farm dogs. It 
is clear, therefore, that even if the conduct of a dairy was a non-con-
forming use in 1929, it was equally one radically different in nature 
from a greyhound racing stable. 
The landowner also contended that the racing stable was an acces-
sory use to the farm. The Court rejected this argument since a racing 
stable is not an ordinary farm activity. This point was, however, only 
dictum since the farm had ceased to exist at least as early as 1947 when 
the raising of dairy cattle was discontinued, and even had the stable 
been an accessory use up to that time, it could not now be accessory to 
a non-existent activity. 
§14.4. Zoning: Delegation of discretionary power. In the last few 
years, several cases have come before the Supreme Judicial Court that 
have involved the question of what body has the power to perform 
certain acts under the zoning laws. In Colabu/alo v. Board 0/ Appeal 
0/ Newton,! discussed in the 1957 ANNUAL SURVEY,2 the Court held 
10 The property had a frontage on the street of approximately 150 feet and the 
depth varied from 310 to 405 feet; the total area was approximately 110,000 square 
feet. The minimum residential lot permitted in the area was 5000 square feet. 
Record, p. 12; Petitioner'S Brief, p. 18. 
11314 Mass. 16,20,49 N.E.2d 453, 455·456 (1943). 
121958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 385, 388, 148 N.E.2d 655, 658, citing the following cases: 
Dunkly v. Erich, 158 F.2d I (9th Cir. 1946); Omaha v. Gsantner, 162 Neb. 839, 77 
N.W.2d 663 (1956); Berry v. Recorder's Court of West Orange, 124 N.J.L 385, 11 
A.2d 743 (1940); Eberlein v. Industrial Commission, 237 Wis. 555, 297 N.W. 429 
(1941). The landowners cited several cases which could have led the Court to the 
opposite conclusion. See Petitioner's Brief, p. 16. 
18 Id., pp. 11·13. 
§14.4. 1336 Mass. 213, 143 N.E.2d 536 (1957). 
21957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §29.6. 
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that, under the enabling statute,S only boards of appeals are given the 
authority to grant variances and thus the act of aldermen in attempt-
ing to grant a variance was invalid. In Pendergast v. Board of Appeals 
of Barnstable' the Supreme Judicial Court held that a Superior Court 
cannot, except in unusual circumstances, grant a variance although 
the facts as found would justify it, if the board of appeals has denied 
it.1i During the 1958 SURVEY year the Court decided that only the 
legislative body of a municipality or its board of appeals can grant a 
permit for an exception. The zoning by-law involved in Coolidge v. 
Planning Board of North Andover6 permitted motels in any zoning dis-
trict after public hearing and approval by the city planning board. 
The by-law included many provisions strictly governing the planning 
board action and it was contended, and the Superior Court accepted,7 
that these provisions made the board action ministerial and adminis-
trative, rather than discretionary. The Supreme Judicial Court found, 
however, that the planning board was given substantial discretion to 
determine if it would permit the motel to be built and had the power 
to impose appropriate conditions. The by-laws thus involved the 
granting of a permit for an exception under the terms of the enabling 
act,S which limits the power to grant permits for exceptions to boards 
of appeals, city councilmen and selectmen. 
In the Coolidge case the defendant town and its planning board 
relied upon the rather similar case of Building Commissioner of 
Medford v. C. &- H. Company,9 in which the Court had upheld a 
zoning ordinance that required that the building commissioner not 
issue a permit for a dump until the petition was approved by the board 
of aldermen. But the Court in Coolidge points out that the C. &- H. 
Company decision stands not for the delegation of zoning power to mu-
nicipal boards but for the retention of the power in the legislative 
body of the municipality. Further, the C. &- H. Company decision is 
now controlled by the 1954 amendments to the zoning laws,lO which 
states that the legislative body of the municipality can retain the power 
to grant permits for exceptions, but that if this power is delegated, it 
can only be delegated to the board of appeals. This case illustrates the 
necessity for careful compliance with the enabling act by municipali-
3 G.L .• c. 4OA. §15. 
,4331 Mass. 555. 120 N.E.2d 916 (1954). 
Ii See discussion of the Pendergast case in 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§1.3. 14.25. 
20.2. and subsequent cases applying the doctrine in 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.2; 
1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.2. The Supreme Judicial Court briefly discussed the 
Pendergast case in dictum during the 1958 SURVEY year in McHugh v. Board of 
Zoning Adjustment of Boston. 336 Mass. 682. 690. 147 N.E.2d 761. 766 (1958). 
61958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 959. 151 N.E.2d 51. For further discussion of the delegation 
aspects of this case. see §13.4 supra. 
7 Record. pp. 12-13. 
S G.L.. c. 40A. §4. The Court pointed out that the action to be taken by the 
planning board under the zoning by-law is substantially the same as that held to 
be the power to grant an exception in Burnham v. Board of Appeals of Gloucester. 
333 Mass. II4, 128 N.E.2d 772 (1955). 
9319 Mass. 273.65 N.E.2d 537 (1946). 
10 Inserted as chapter 40A by Acts of 1954. c. 368. 
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ties if they are not to have some portions of their zoning plans made at 
least temporarily ineffective. 
§I4.5. Zoning procedure: Availability of writ of mandamus. Prac-
titioners have found that many of the most troublesome zoning prob-
lems relate to procedural questions. This is unfortunate since the 
purpose of procedure is to aid, not hinder, one seeking to enforce his 
substantive rights. A fair degree of certainty is obtainable under care-
fully drafted statutes and ordinances, but no matter how great the 
certainty attempted by legislation there will always be unanswered pro-
cedural questions. Three cases decided by the Supreme Judicial Court 
during the 1958 SURVEY year have settled several unresolved procedural 
questions, and will be discussed in the next sections of this chapter.1 
One of the major problems facing parties aggrieved in some way by 
action of zoning authorities is what procedure the parties must follow 
to enforce their rights. In 1955 the General Court amended G.L., c. 
40A, §13,2 to cover certain zoning appeal situations. The amended 
section reads as follows: 
An appeal to the board of appeals established under section 
fourteen may be taken by any person aggrieved by reason of his 
inability to obtain a permit from any administrative official under 
the provisions of this chapter, or by any officer or board of the 
city or town, or by any persons aggrieved by any order or decision 
of the inspector of buildings or other administrative official in 
violation of any provision of this chapter, or any ordinance or by-
law adopted thereunder.s 
This marked a change from previous procedure, whereby only appli-
cants for a permit had a right to appeal in these situations to the local 
board of appeals; aggrieved persons other than applicants for permits 
did not have this right unless the local ordinance or by-law gave it to 
them.4 Thus these persons aggrieved, prior to the 1955 amendment, 
sought mandamus to enforce their rights when the local law did not 
provide for appea1.5 The question of to what extent these persons 
aggrieved may still bring mandamus rather than appeal to the board of 
appeals arose during the 1958 SURVEY year in Atherton v. Selectmen of 
Bourne.6 Petitioners brought a writ of mandamus seeking to have an 
amendment to the town zoning by-law declared invalid. In a prior 
§14.5. 1 See, in addition to the present section, §§14.6-I4.7 infra. 
2 Acts of 1955, c. 325, §I, discussed in 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§13.3, 18.6. 
S G.L.. c. 40A. §13. 
4 See discussion in Atherton v. Selectmen of Bourne. 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 511. 
517-518. 149 N.E.2d 232. 236. and the opinion of the Superior Court in Record. pp. 
114-118. See 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §20.1 for a special case in which the 
Court held that the writ of certiorari was the only permissible form of judicial re-
view. 
5 See cases collected in 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 511.517. 149 N.E.2d 232. 236. 
61958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 511. 149 N.E.2d 232. The substantive zoning law aspects of 
this case are discussed in §14.2 supra. 
--1-
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case the Supreme Judicial Court had reversed the granting of a vari-
ance covering the property,7 the rezoning of which is in dispute in the 
present case. A stop work order was then issued by the town. The act 
of the building inspector complained of was his notification, after the 
adoption of the zoning amendment, that the stop work order was no 
longer in effect.s The Superior Court ruled that the appropriate 
remedy was an appeal to the board of appeals, under G.L., c. 40A, §13, 
quoted above. The bases of the decision were that mandamus was an 
extraordinary remedy that will only lie if another remedy is not avail-
able and that the zoning enabling act, being intended to cover the en-
tire subject completely and containing a remedy for violations, super-
sedes other remedies.9 The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding 
that mandamus would lie. It found that there was no "order or de-
cision" of the building inspector from which the statutory appeal 
would lie. The Court did not believe that a right of appeal, which 
was subject to reasonable time limitations under the statute,10 could 
depend on the fortuitous discovery by adjacent landowners that work 
had recommenced on the building.ll 
The analysis of the history and purpose of Section 13 by the Superior 
Court is a very commendable one and is basically unobjectionable ex-
cept as applied to rather special facts, such as were present in the 
Atherton case. Unfortunately there is no recording or other notifica-
tion of some actions of inspectors of buildings12 and, as the Supreme 
Judicial Court points out, rights to appeal could well be lost without 
any laches on the part of adjacent landowners. The Superior Court is 
probably right, however, in its theory that the provisions of the zoning 
enabling act should cover the entire field. This will not be possible, 
however, until some reasonable means of notification of interested 
parties of every action for which appeal is provided is required by the 
enabling act or local ordinance. It is also possible that it would not 
be constitutionally possible to provide that boards of appeals deter-
mine the validity of zoning by-laws, which is what the Atherton case 
involved. This point did not have to be decided by the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court, since mandamus was held to be a proper remedy, but the 
Court cites cases from other jurisdictions in which it was held that 
7 Atherton v. Board of Appeals of Bourne. 334 Mass. 451. 136 N.E.2d 201 (1956). 
S The evidence does not make certain whether the removal of the stop work order 
was done by a physical removal of the order from the premises or by a personal 
notification to the landowner. 
9 Record. pp. 119·121. 
., 
10 General Laws. c. 40A. §13. provides. in addition to the material quoted in the 
text. that "A zoning ordinance or by· law may prescribe a reasonable time within 
which appeals under this section may be taken." The town of Bourne apparently 
had not prescribed any time for appeals under this section. 
11 In the present case most of the adjacent landowners were summer residents and 
the stop work order was removed in November. when they would ordinarily not 
find out about it. 
12 This point and the problems it raises are discussed in 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §lB.6. 
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boards of appeals could not perform the purely, rather than quasi, ju-
dicial function of determining the validity of a legislative enactment.13 
The Supreme Judicial Court's opinion in the Atherton case still 
leaves unresolved the procedural questions of whether an amendment 
to a zoning by-law or ordinance can be constitutionally reviewed by a . 
board of appeals and what actually, under the statute, constitutes an 
appealable "order or decision" of an inspector of buildings. It is per-
haps unfortunate that the Court did not at least give a guide to its 
probable answers to these questions, since as long as they remain un-
answered, there will be procedural confusion. The Court should not, 
as a general practice, bind itself by attempting to suggest its solutions 
to problems not actually before it, but there is considerable merit in a 
judicial policy of settling, to the extent dictum can do so, procedural 
questions as completely as possible when the time of the Court permits 
it to do so. 
§14.6. Zoning procedure: Aggrieved landowners as intervenors. 
Aggrieved landowners are not permitted to enforce zoning ordinances 
and by-laws by direct suit against the violator1 but they can bring 
mandamus against the enforcing authority to require that it act to en-
force the ordinance or by-Iaw.2 They have also been permitted to 
maintain a petition for contempt against a landowner who failed to 
comply with the order of a court.3 A rather special situation, however, 
which arose during the 1958 SURVEY year, involves the rights of ag-
grieved adjacent landowners to intervene in a suit in which the mu-
nicipality seeks enforcement of the zoning law against the user of cer-
tain property. In City of Haverhill v. DiBurr04 the city, on May 25, 
1956, brought a bill in equity to enjoin the defendant from using cer-
tain premises in violation of the zoning ordinance. The attorneys for 
the defendant and the city, on September 10, 1956, signed a form of 
final decree which recited that the bill of complaint was dismissed but 
the trial court did not act on this draft decree. The master, before 
whom the case was being heard, suspended the hearings on September 
17, 1956, upon orders of the court. The court, however, on Septem-
ber 28, 1956, allowed a motion by certain adjacent landowners to in-
tervene and recommitted the case to the master. On December 3, 
1956, the city filed a paper stating that it withdrew from the decree dis-
131958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 511,519, 149 N.E.2d 232, 237. 
§14.6. 1 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Merchant Enterprises, Inc., 332 Mass. 484, 488, 
126 N.E.2d 112, 115 (1955). 
2 Colabufalo v. Public Buildings Commissioner of Newton, 332 Mass. 748, 127 
N.E.2d 564 (1955). The persons whose acts are complained of are allowed to inter-
vene or they may be ordered into the case.' City of Haverhill v. DiBurro, 1958 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 481, 485,148 N.E.2d 642, 645. 
3 Colabufalo v. Public Buildings Commissioner of Newton, 332 Mass. 748, 127 
N.E.2d 564 (1955), and 336 Mass. 205,143 N.E.2d 477 (1957). 
41958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 481, 148 N.E.2d 642. The substantive zoning law of this 
case is discussed in §14.3 supra. 
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missing the complaint.1i The intervenors presented all of the evidence 
heard by the master after the master was again ordered to proceed with 
the case. The Superior Court dismissed the bill of complaint of the 
intervenors but enjoined the defendant on the basis of the relief sought 
in the original complaint of the city. The Supreme Judicial Court 
held that the bill of the intervenors was improperly dismissed although 
it added that it was making "no suggestion as to their standing in 
respect of pressing for enforcement of the final decree." 6 
The decision is completely sound because of the special circum-
stances of this case wherein, at the time intervention was permitted, the 
enforcing authority had indicated it would not proceed with the case. 
The intervenors had a substantial interest in the dispute, since there is 
no question but that they could have brought a separate mandamus 
action to require the enforcing authority to act. The Supreme Ju-
dicial Court thus found that the trial court was within its discretion in 
admitting the adjacent landowners as intervenors, although had the 
city been actively proceeding with the case it was questionable if in-
tervention would be permissible. The "substantial interest" 7 re-
quired for intervention by the adjacent landowners, therefore, is not 
that they have any direct right in seeing that the land was used in ac-
cordance with the zoning ordinance but that they have a right to re-
quire the enforcing authority to act. Permitting intervention in the 
present case did not therefore substitute the private intervenors for 
the public authority but merely was a means of accomplishing in the 
one action both the enforcement of the right of the intervenors to have 
the public authority act to enforce the ordinance, and the public right 
of the enforcing authority to require compliance with the ordinance. 
The Court showed considerable wisdom in permitting this petition 
to intervene, as it at least assured that rights would be enforced in only 
one suit rather than in at least two and possibly three separate actions. 
The solution reached by the Court suggests that consideration might 
be given to legislation permitting adjacent landowners, who are ag-
grieved by the failure to enforce a zoning ordinance or by-law, to start 
proceedings directly against the offender, with the enforcing authority 
being given proper notice and the absolute right to intervene. The 
proceedings might very properly be initiated before the board of ap-
peals8 after notification of intent to the enforcing authority and a 
delay, perhaps of thirty days, to permit the enforcing authority to act 
first and separately if it so desired. 
Ii This date was considerably after the testimony before the master was completed. 
Hearing on the master's draft report was held on November 29, 1956. and the final 
report was dated December 14. 1956. Record. pp. 15.21. 
61958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 481. 488. 148 N.E.2d 642.647. 
7 See Check v. Kaplan. 280 Mass. 170. 178. 182 N.E. 305. 308 (1932). wherein it is 
stated that the intervenor must have "a substantial interest in the subject matter of 
the original litigation." 
8 General Laws. c. 40A. §13. permits the taking of an appeal to the board of 
appeals "by any person aggrieved by any order or decision of the inspector of build-
15
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§14.7. Zoning procedure: Participation of members required for 
valid decision. McHugh v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of Bostonl 
arose under the Boston zoning statute.2 The question involved the ex-
tent of required participation by members of the board in the hearing 
and decision on an adjustment of zoning boundaries. The application 
for change in zoning boundaries was heard before nine members of 
the twelve-man board. The written record of the decision was signed 
by ten members, two of whom had not attended the hearing. The 
statute requires that at least four-fifths of the members of the board 
qualified to act sign a decision for changing zoning boundaries, but also 
states that "A majority of the board shall constitute a quorum for all 
public hearings ... " 3. The Supreme Judicial Court decided 4 that 
the action of the members of the board was valid under the precise 
terms of the statute although, in the absence of such precise termi-
nology, the Court has in the past required that all who signed decisions 
must have also attended the hearing on which the decision was based. 5 
Considering the difficulty experienced in obtaining legislation from 
the General Court reducing the number of situations in which una-
nimity is required for valid decisions of boards of appeals acting un-
der the zoning enabling act,6 this particular statutory provision in-
itially seems to be surprisingly lenient. The Board of Zoning Adjust-
ment of Boston, however, is a creature of the General Court rather 
than the city, and members are selected from organizations whose indi-
vidual members have a particular interest and knowledge of the use 
ings or other administrative official in violation of any provision of this chapter, or 
any ordinance or by· law adopted thereunder." Thus, if legislation were enacted 
requiring the enforcing authority of a city or town to bring suit for enforcement at 
the instance of an aggrieved adjacent landowner, its decision not to do so would 
be an appealable decision under this section of the zoning enabling act. 
§14.7. 1 336 Mass. 682, 147 N.E.2d 761 (1958). The substantive zoning law aspects 
of this case are discussed in §14.2 supra. 
2 Acts of 1924, c. 488. This act is in the process of being replaced by a new zoning 
statute for Boston, enacted as Acts of 1956, c. 665, and amended by Acts of 1958, c. 
77. See discussion of the 1958 amendments in §14.12 infra. 
3 Acts of 1924, c. 488, §20, as amended. 
4 Although the Court decided that the requisite numbers of members participated 
in the decision, it reversed the granting of the change in zoning boundaries, so that 
a determination on the point of participation by the members was not required to 
obtain the actual decision in the case. Even if viewed as dictum, however, the dis-
cussion of this procedural point will aid the board and parties appearing before it. 
until it is replaced by the new zoning commission. As indicated in the text sup· 
ported by note 9 infra, the same policy exists in the new zoning law for the city. 
See the suggestion made in §14.5 supra that discussion of proper procedure. even 
if not a holding of the Court. would be desirable in certain cases. 
5 For a discussion of this point by the Court. see 336 Mass. 682. 684-685. 147 
N.E.2d 761.763 (1958). 
6 Acts of 1955. c. 349, relieved boards of appeals of more than four members from 
the requirement of unanimous agreement in certain types of cases. The statute. and 
the difficulties over the years in obtaining its passage. are discussed in 1955 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §§13.3, 18.7. 
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of land within the city.7 The function of the Board of Zoning Adjust-
ment is also not that of a board of appeals, since it acts in the first in-
stance, as a quasi-legislative body, to change the zoning regulations of 
the city.s It may thus be assumed that the General Court felt that, 
even in the absence of attendance at the public hearing, a reading of 
the record of the testimony at the hearing by members absent there-
from would insure an intelligent and informed vote, since all members 
are particularly qualified for their position on the board. 
The new zoning law of the city of Boston provides that six com-
missioners constitute a quorum for public hearings relating to adop-
tion, amendment and repeal of zoning regulations, but that at least 
seven commissioners must concur on the adoption, amendment or re-
peal of a zoning regulation and further, that concurrence by at least 
nine commissioners is required to override the mayor's veto.9 The 
General Court has thus continued the same policy as to participation 
of commissioners as the McHugh case finds was permissible under the 
1924 act, as amended. Again, not all commissioners who vote on a 
zoning regulation need attend the public hearing on this regulation to 
have their votes considered valid. 
§14.8. Mill Act: Damages for Howing land. General Laws, c. 253, 
the Mill Act, permits certain dams to be built within the Common-
wealth and prescribes the procedure to be used to assess damages to 
those whose land is injured by the building and use of these permitted 
dams. Lombardi v. Bailey,! decided during the 1958 SURVEY year, was 
an action under the act to recover for the flowing of plaintiffs' land 
caused by the dam that defendants had erected to flow their adjoining 
cranberry bog. Section 3 of the act provides: "The height to which 
the water may be raised ... may be determined by the jury." 2 
Prior to the Lombardi case the Supreme Judicial Court had not de-
cided if this section required or merely allowed a finding on the per-
mitted height of the water.3 The Court determined that this finding 
was, in ordinary cases, a mandatory one, since the height of the water 
above the dam had to be found before the damages for flowing land 
could be determined. This height would also be necessary if a tort 
7 Acts of 1924, c. 488, §20, as amended by Acts of 1952, c. 109, §l. Members are 
representatives of such organizations as the Boston Central Labor Union, Greater 
Boston Chamber of Commerce and the Boston Real Estate Board. It is probable 
that the Board of Zoning Adjustment will be replaced by the new Zoning Commis-
sion by the time this article is published. This commission is created by Acts of 
1956, c. 665, §1, as amended by Acts of 1958, c. 77, §1, and the larger part of the 
membership of this commission also will represent substantially the same organi-
zations that are now represented on the Board of Zoning Adjustment under the 
1924 Act. 
S See Acts of 1924, c. 488, §§19-20, as amended. 
1} Acts of 1956, c. 665, §3, as amended by Acts of 1958, c. 77, §2. 
§14.8. ! 336 Mass. 587, 147 N.E.2d 169 (1958). 
2 Similarly, Section 9 of the act permits the jury to determine the height of the 
dam. 
3 The Court has collected the cases at 336 Mass. 587, 592, 147 N.E.2d 169, 173 
(1958). 
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action was later brought for flowing beyond the height set or if the 
height was properly increased at a later time, since the original per-
mitted height would be required to determine the damages. The 
Court recognized, however, that a finding of the height of the water 
might not be mandatory in cases in which there are other ready means 
of determining water height. On the facts of the present case the 
Court found that the auditor, who was the fact finder, had to make this 
finding and returned the case to the Superior Court for that purpose. 
Damages granted under the act include past damages and damages 
for future injury.4 The jury is required to assess damages "taking into 
consideration any damage caused by the dam to other land of the 
petitioner as well as the damage caused thereby to the land overflowed; 
and they shall also allow by way of set-off any benefit caused thereby to 
petitioner's land." 5 In the Lombardi case the auditor, acting as fact 
finder, accepted testimony of the net annual loss to the petitioners, 
without requiring testimony of gross damage and benefits resulting 
from the flooding. There was, however, considerable testimony as to 
the type of damage suffered by the property and the auditor also had 
the benefit of a view of the land. The Supreme Judicial Court held 
that there was no abuse of Superior Court discretion in accepting the 
auditor's finding of annual net loss, although the loss should properly 
be adduced by questions relating to rental values of the land before 
and after flowing. 6 It was suggested, however, that the Superior Court 
could, in its discretion, direct the auditor to show that he used the cor-
rect measure of damages, since the report had to be recommitted to 
permit the auditor to determine the height of the water. I 
B. LEGISLATION 
§14.9. Zoning Enabling Act. Section 15(3) of the Zoning Enabling 
Act states the criteria that boards of appeals must find in order to grant 
a valid variance.1 One of the criteria has been that "owing to condi-
tions especially affecting such parcel or such building but not affecting 
generally the zoning district in which it is located, a literal enforcement 
of the provisions of the ordinance or by-law would involve sub-
stantial hardship to the appellant." A question has always existed as 
to what type of hardship constitutes "substantial hardship" under this 
criterion. The early Massachusetts zoning cases established the· doc-
trine that the financial situation of the landowner will not alone con-
;I G.L., c. 253, §§8, 10. 
5 Id. §8. 
6 See Howe v. Ray, 113 Mass. 88 (1873); Palmer Co. v. Ferrill, 17 Pick. 58 (Mass. 
1835). The test of damages is the same as that applied in eminent domain cases. 
G.L., c. 79. §12. 
§14.9. 1 G.L., c. 40A, §15(3). The criteria established by this section have been 
substantially in effect since the initial adoption of a zoning enabling act in 1920. 
Acts of 1920, c. 601, §§2, 9. The full statement of the present criteria, however, was 
not adopted until Acts of 1933, c. 269, §I. 
I 
~ 
I j 
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stitute sufficient grounds for granting a variance':! Without question 
this is sound since, as the Court has stated 3 and the statute specifically 
requires,4 the variance power must be exercised to preserve the public 
good and it is only when the public good will not be harmed that a 
variance can be granted upon the statutorily required further showing 
of "substantial hardship" and "conditions especially affecting" the 
land "but not affecting generally the zoning district." 
The holdings of the Supreme Judicial Court in several recent cases 
have, however, suggested that "substantial hardship" under the statute 
can never be purely financial hardship but must at least include hard-
ship other than an economic one.5 1£ the opinions of the Court are 
analyzed properly this is not what the Court is actually saying. The 
Court is making clear that either the other element of the requirement 
on the individual landowner, the uniqueness of his property in relation 
to others similarly zoned,6 or the requirement that the public good 
must be considered 7 has not been met. These statements of the Court 
are and have been needed, since it is certain that variances are sought 
by landowners in all but a few cases for the purpose of economically 
benefiting themselves. The arguments they make concerning the 
uniqueness of their property and the lack of detriment to the public 
good and the zoning system are essentially afterthoughts made to 
comply with the statute. The Court must continually emphasize for 
the benefit of boards of appeals and landowners that the financial posi-
2 See, e.g., Phillips v. Board of Appeals of Building Department of City of Spring-
field, 286 Mass. 469, 472, 190 N.E. 601, 602 (1934); Amero v. Board of Appeal of City 
of Gloucester, 283 Mass. 45, 52, 186 N.E. 61, 63 (1933); Prusik v. Board of Appeal of 
Building Department of City of Boston, 262 Mass. 451, 457, 160 N.E. 312, 314 (1928). 
See also the more recent cases of Everpure Ice Manufacturing Co. v. Board of Ap-
peals of Lawrence, 324 Mass. 433, 438, 86 N.E.2d 906, 910 (1949); Real Properties, 
Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 319 Mass. 180, 183, 65 N.E.2d 199, 201 (1946). 
This is the general view in this country. See Annotation, 168 A.L.R. 13, 30-33 
(1947). 
3 See Everpure Ice Manufacturing Co. v. Board of Appeals of Lawrence, 324 Mass. 
433, 438-439, 86 N.E.2d 906, 910·911 (1949); Prusik v. Board of Appeal of Building 
~artment of City of Boston, 262 Mass. 451,457, 160 N.E. 312, 314 (1928). 
4 General Laws, c. 40A, §15(3), permits the grant of a valid variance only "where 
desirable relief may be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and 
without nullifying or substantially derogating from the intent or purpose of such 
ordinance or by·law ... " This is, of course, an additional requirement to the 
criterion dealing with the private landowner and his property. 
5 See Reynolds v. Board of Appeal of Springfield, 335 Mass. 464, 469·470, 140 
N.E.2d 491, 496 (1957); Blackman v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 334 Mass. 446, 
450, 136 N.E.2d 198, 200 (1956). The 1958 SURVEY year case of Vainas v. Board of 
Appeals of Lynn, 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 895, 898, 150 N.E.2d 721, 723, also upholds 
without comment a finding by the Superior Court that no "substantial hardship" 
existed, although the Superior Court's finding included a statement that financial 
hardship alone could not be "substantial hardship" under the statute. For the 
statement of the Superior Court, see note 10 infra. 
6 See Reynolds v. Board of Appeal of Springfield, 335 Mass. 464, 470, 140 N.E.2d 
491,496 (1957); Blackman v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 334 Mass. 446, 450, 136 
N.E.2d 198,200 (1956). 
7 See Blackman v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 334 Mass. at 450, 136 N.E.2d at 
200. 
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tion of a landowner is not enough to warrant the grant of a variance. 
The Court has also, in these cases faced situations in which property 
was usable in accordance with the zoning restrictions applicable, but 
a more profitable use could be made of it if the zoning was liberalized.s 
This type of case is essentially and importantly different from those in 
which a building or land is basically unusable under the zoning re-
strictions applicable to it.9 In this later type of case there is true fi-
nancial hardship but in the first type of case there is, correctly speak-
ing, no hardship at all but merely a question of financial gain. When 
only a question of financial gain is involved, the grant of a variance 
will in all but a very few situations fail because the landowner cannot 
show that his land is unique in this respect from others in the zoning 
district. 
While the Court has not meant to change its interpretation of what 
constitutes "substantial hardship" under the statute, there has been 
some doubt concerning the meaning. tO Acts of 1958, c. 381, which 
adds to Section 15(3) of the Zoning Enabling Act the phrase "financial 
or otherwise" immediately following "substantial hardship," is a clari-
fying amendment.ll It does, of course, remove any doubt that fi-
nancial hardship alone, if of a substantial nature, and if all other 
8 In Vainas v. Board of Appeals of Lynn, 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 895, 150 N.E.2d 721, 
the landowner sought a variance permitting a full third story on a two and one-half 
story building. For a discussion of this case, see §14.1 supra. In Reynolds v. Board 
of Appeal of Springfield, 335 Mass. 464, 140 N.E.2d 491 (1957), the landowner sought 
permission to transfer a dwelling house into a nursing home. In Blackman v. Board 
of Appeals of Barnstable, 334 Mass. 446, 136 N.E.2d 198 (1956), the landowner sought 
a variance to establish a bathhouse on beach property zoned for residential purposes, 
a variance having previously been granted to permit use of the property for l?ark-
ing. 
9 The 1958 SURVEY year case of Rodenstein v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 1958 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 599, 149 N.E.2d 382, discussed in §14.1 supra, illustrates a situation 
in which land is unusable for the purposes for which zoned. 
to See, e.g., Record, p. 9, in Vainas v. Board of Appeals of Lynn, 1958 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 895, 150 N.E.2d 721, wherein the Superior Court states in its findings: "It might 
be financially more beneficial to the Owner if the variance were granted, but the 
only hardship, if any, which he would suffer from the denial of the variance would 
be of a financial nature. There was no evidence before me as to the amount or ex-
tent of any such financial hardship. I find that any such financial hardship is not 
a 'substantial hardship' within the meaning of General Laws (Ter. Ed.), Chapter 
40A, Section 15; and if a mere financial hardship can be or become a 'substantial 
hardship' within the meaning of such quoted words as used in said statute, then I 
find that the amount of any financial hardship which the Owner would suffer by a 
denial of this variance would not be substantial." 
11 The part of Section 15(3) amended now reads: ". . . owing to conditions es-
pecially affecting such parcel or such building but not affecting generally the zoning 
district in which it is located a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance 
or by-law would involve substantial hardship, financial or otherwise to the appel-
lant .•. " The italicized words are those added by the amendment. 
The act, as originally filed as House No. 3008, would quite possibly have changed 
the results of the Massachusetts cases, even though as actually enacted it merely re-
states the present doctrine. The proposed act would have added, after the part of 
the section quoted above, the phrase " ... not commensurate with benefit received 
by the municipality by the restricted use of said premises." 
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requirements of the statute are met, will permit the grant of a vari-
ance. For the reasons stated above in this section, however, the 
amendment does not in any sense change the result of the cases that 
gave rise to the amendment; it will merely remove doubts some have 
felt because of the opinions of the Court in some recent cases. 
Section 21 of the Zoning Enabling Act,12 providing for appeals to 
the Superior Court, was modified by Acts of 1958, c. 175. The appeal 
must now be filed within twenty days after the decision has been filed 
with the office of the city or town clerk, in place of within fifteen days 
after the decision is recorded. Since Section 18 of the Zoning Enabling 
Act prescribes filing with the town or city clerk as the means of making 
decisions of the board matters of public record, this change merely in-
creases the time allowed for appeals by an additional five days. The 
change conforms the appeal period to that already prescribed for ap-
peals from actions of planning boards.13 The amendment also adopts 
a new provision that the notice of the appeal must be given to the city 
or town clerk in time to be received by him within the twenty-day ap-
peal period. This notice, therefore, will also make the appeal a matter 
of public record. 
Acts of 1958, c. 202, clarifies the provision of the Zoning Enabling 
Act relative to the appointment and use of associate members of boards 
of appeals.14 The chairman of the board is given specific authority'to 
designate an associate member to sit in the absence of a regular mem-
ber as well as in the previously covered situations of a regular member 
not acting because of inability or interest. The provision for assign-
ment by the chairman of an alternate to sit when a vacancy occurs is 
clarified to indicate that the member so designated will continue to sit 
until the vacancy is properly filled.15 
§14.10. Subdivision Control Law. The Subdivision Control Law,1 
as adopted in 1953,2 has fulfilled its general purposes quite adequately 
but, as with all extensive and essentially novel legislation, amendments 
are required to clarify provisions that have proven vague, inexact or 
incomplete in practice. The purpose of subdivision control is to de-
velop proper land use in subdivisions and within communities but the 
law has, in certain instances, acted so as to interfere with prompt de-
velopment even in instances in which the land use plan was appropri-
ate. During the 1958 SURVEY year the General Court adopted four 
amendments to the Subdivision Control Law which should insure more 
efficient as well as more correct practices under the law.3 
Action on subdivision plan. The most extensive amendment com-
12 G.L., c. 4OA, §21. 
18 G.L., c. 41, §81, prescribing 20-day appeal period. 
14 Id. §14. 
15 The same clarification was made by Acts of 1958, c. 201, to the boards of appeals 
provision of the Subdivision Control Law, G.L., c. 41, §81Z. 
§14.10. 1 G.L., c. 41, §§81K·81GG. 
2 Acts of 1953, c. 674. 
8 Acts of 1958, cc. 201, 206, 207, 377. 
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• pletely replaced Section 81U of the law, which covers approval, modi-
I fication or disapproval of a subdivision plan.4 The amendment is 
designed to expedite the planning board process by the insertion of de-
tailed procedural instructions on certain points, without making any 
major changes in substantive requirements. The section before amend-
ment provided that within ten days of submission of the plan to the 
planning board the board should consult·· with the local board of 
healthll as to whether use of the subdivision or part of it for building 
sites would present a public health problem. The amendment re-
quires the developer to file a copy of his definitive plan concurrently 
with the local board of health and the planning board. The board 
of health must act within forty-five days, failure to act being deemed 
approval of the public health aspects of the plan. The powers given 
to the board of health has been specified in greater detail by the 
amendment and it must now give its reasons for disapproval of any 
building site and, if possible, its recommendations for adjustments 
necessary to remove the health hazard. The new provisions, in speci-
fying the duties and responsibilities of local boards of health, will 
largely avoid the confusion of diverse local requirements, and will 
insure that all parties interested in the plan understand the duties and 
obligations of the others. 
The planning board under Section 81U has always had the power 
to require provision for construction of ways and installation of mu-
nicipal services. The developer could secure this construction and 
installation by either a bond or deposit of securities or by subjecting 
the plan to a condition that no lot would be sold and no building 
would be constructed until the construction of ways and installation 
of municipal services were completed, subject to certain exceptions. 
This part of the section was incomplete and insufficiently detailed to 
furnish adequate guides to planning boards and developers, and the 
1958 amendment is designed to clarify these provisions so that they are 
more completely workable. In addition the amendment has changed 
the provision that performance may be secured by a condition to the 
plan to a provision that it may be secured by a duly recorded covenant 
running with the land.6 This provision will avoid the confusion that 
4 Id., c. 377. 
Ii The provisions of the section, both before and after amendment, apply to local 
boards of health or to such board or officer having public health powers and duties. 
6 The planning boards of some cities and towns within the Commonwealth have, 
as is well known, at times used the indefiniteness of the statute to prevent develop-
ment of subdivisions that have met all legal requirements. See Muldoon, The 
Practical Background of the Zoning and Planning Problems of the Present and 
Future, 43 Mass. L.Q. No.2, pp. 13, 16.17 (1958). As Muldoon points out, land use 
planning is not a purely local problem, particularly in eastern Massachusetts where 
the economies of the communities around Boston are completely intertwined. Thus 
the greater detailing of the duties and powers of planning boards and other land 
use bodies is a desirable development as it will help prevent local pressures within 
one community from affecting. perhaps seriously. the other communities contiguous 
to it. The other alternative, as Muldoon comments. is a state rather than local 
system of land use planning. 
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has existed as to whether deeds violating the restraint are voidable or 
void by making them specifically voidable within three years from the 
date of the deed. 
Preliminary plans. One of the major difficulties with the Sub-
division Control Law has been the inexactness and incompleteness of 
the provisions relating to the preliminary plans that may be submitted 
to planning boards. Acts of 1958, c. 205, is designed to remove from 
the law on this subject the ambiguities that have been discovered in its 
application. 
A new definition is inserted in Section 81L, to define "preliminary 
plan." 7 One of the greatest problems under the law has been the un-
certainty as to what should be included in the preliminary plan that 
may be submitted to the planning board by the developer. Because of 
this uncertainty local planning boards have instituted many diverse 
requirements. This new definition will now furnish the necessary 
guide to both builders and planning boards, and should remove one 
of the major sources of delay in obtaining approval of a subdivision 
plan. 
Section 81S of the law, on submission of preliminary plans, is com-
pletely replaced by the amendment, but the amendment makes only 
two changes of substance.8 It modifies the section to make it clear that 
any person may submit a preliminary plan and, if he does, must 
comply with certain prescribed notice provisions. It also provides 
that the board may disapprove the plan and, in that case, must in-
dicate its reasons for disapproval.9 
The amendment also inserts a new sentence in Section 81Q of the 
law, which governs adoption of rules and regulations by the planning 
boards.10 The new provision prescribes the standards that the plan-
ning board will use in approving or disapproving the preliminary 
plan, and the definitive plan derived therefrom, as those standards in 
effect at the time of submission of the preliminary plan.ll 
Certificate of appeal. Acts of 1958, c. 207, is also an amendment to 
the Subdivision Control Law. It adds an additional requirement be-
fore a register of deeds can record a subdivision plan approved by the 
planning board. The plan must, under the amendment, bear a cer-
tificate of the clerk of the city or town that no notice of appeal was 
7 Acts of 1958, c. 206, §l. 
8 Id. §2. 
\) The original Section 81S did. by the use of the words "may give such preliminary 
plan its tentative approval," give the planning board by inference the power to dis-
approve the plan. There was, however, no provision requiring the board to state 
its reasons for disapproval. 
10 Acts of 1958, c. 206, §3. 
11 This, of course, can avoid the difficulty created for a builder by a board cha~g­
ing its standards to avoid approval of the subdivision plan. This provision carnes 
forward the policy of Acts of 1956. c. 307, prohibiting a planning board from mak-
ing a change in its rules and regulations applicable to a pending matter. See 195.6 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1.3. Protection of subdivision developers from zoning ordl-
nance and by-laws changes was also given by Acts of 1957, c. 297. See 1957 Ann_ 
Surv. Mass. Law §11.3. 
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received during the twenty days following receipt and recording of the 
notice of approval of the plan by the planning board. 
Associate members of boards of appeals. Acts of 1958, c. 201, clarifies 
the provisions of the Subdivision Control Law relative to the appoint-
ment of associate members of the boards of appeals.12 The chairman 
of the board is given specific authority to designate an associate mem-
ber to sit in the absence of a regular member in addition to the situa-
tions covered in the original section, i.e., when a regular member can-
not act because of inability or interest. The provisions for assignment 
by the chairman of an alternate member to sit when a vacancy occurs 
on the board is clarified to indicate that the member so designated will 
continue to sit until the vacancy is properly filled. is 
§14.11. Construction by the Commonwealth: Damage to privately 
owned land. One of the major problems connected with construction 
by and for the Commonwealth has been that damage is often done, 
during blasting and drilling operations, to near-by property that has 
not been taken by eminent domain. The problem is illustrated by 
Sullivan v. Commonwealth,1 discussed in the 1957 ANNUAL SURVEy,2 
in which blasting done by a contractor "in a careful and approved 
manner" set up vibrations in a rock formation that caused considerable 
damage through the cracking of plaster and the breaking of a water 
pipe. The plaintiff landowner did not recover since no statutory au-
thority existed for the payment of damages on these facts and there 
could be no recovery on a nuisance theory since the Commonwealth 
had not consented to be sued in tort. The damage was also held not to 
be a "taking" of private land for public use and therefore the constitu-
tional requirement of payment did not apply. In another case, Webster 
Thomas Co. v. Commonwealth,s also discussed in the 1957 ANNUAL 
SURVEy,4 recovery was permitted upon basically similar facts because 
the statute governing the laying out of state highways permits recovery 
for damage caused to near-by property by the construction work.5 
The contrary results of these and similar cases, when damage arises 
from basically similar injuries, has prompted the General Court to 
create a special commission to study the problem of this type of dam-
age and to determine the feasibility of compensating landowners for 
their injuries.6 
One of the penalties landowners properly suffer as members of a 
community is that the use of their land is subject to control for social 
purposes, and may consequently have a lower value than if its use were 
unrestricted. It is also proper for the community to do work for social 
12 G.L., c. 41, §SIZ. 
is The same correction is made by Acts of 1955, c. 202, to the board of appeals 
provisions of the Zoning Enabling Act, G.L., c. 40A, §14. 
§14.ll. 1335 Mass. 619,142 N.E.2d 347 (1957). 
2 See 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§22.1, 29.7. 
S 336 Mass. 130,143 N.E.2d 216 (1957). 
4 See 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §29.7. 
5 General Laws, c. SI, §7, permitted recovery in this case. 
6 Resolves of 1955, c. 14. 
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purposes, such as building roads, near private property and this, too, 
may lower the value of the land. Thus, in considering the problem of 
damage to land that may be caused by work done by the community 
for social purposes we could treat these damages as one of the expenses 
private landowners must accept as a price of being a member of the 
community. But there is a distinction between the lowering of market 
value and actual physical damage to property, since the physical dam-
age must ordinarily be repaired immediately, and the expense may be 
a heavy burden to the landowner. And we have a feeling of injustice 
when two landowners similarly injured, as illustrated by the Sullivan 
and Webster Thomas Co. cases, do not receive similar damages. Some 
provision for compensation for damages done to all near-by property 
by work done by or for the Commonwealth is just and proper. 
The solution of this problem should be the imposition of an absolute 
liability on the Commonwealth, with a provision that damage up to 
a certain amount remain uncompensable. The eminent domain cases, 
and the inexactness of the test used in these cases, makes a taking test 
inadequate since few if any of these damages constitute a taking.7 
Recovery should not be based upon any theory of nuisance, since it 
is not the negligence of the Commonwealth and its agents, but the 
damage done to private land, that is in issue. The only proper theory 
of liability is therefore one based on absolute liability. The Common-
wealth should, however, have the defense of negligence on the part of 
the landowner, and should only have to pay damages to compensate 
for those injuries that proper action by the landowner could not pre-
vent. To avoid a multiplicity of small claims, some minimum limit 
on liability should be imposed. Landowners, as members of a com-
munity, may properly not receive compensation for all the damages 
they have suffered.8 It would seem most fair to have this recom-
mended minimum some percentage of the assessed value of the prop-
erty, perhaps one-half of one percent. Thus, for example, damages of 
over fifty dollars to property assessed at $10,000 would be paid by the 
Commonwealth, and the landowner would receive no compensation 
for damages up to fifty dollars. 
§14.12. Local zoning legislation. The most important Massachu-
setts statute governing the details of zoning in a particular locality is 
the Boston zoning law, first adopted in 1924.1 In 1956 the General 
Court enacted a new zoning law for the city of Boston, which has re-
cently been accepted by· the city.2 Acts of 1958, c. 77, amended the 
7 See comment in 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §22.1. 
8 Setting a limit on damages would not seem to be objectionable on constitutional 
grounds. Certainly there is no requirement of compensation under the present law 
of the Commonwealth, except as it is given by statute. The proposed limit would 
treat each owner equally and the test based on assessment value of the property is a 
means courts would accept as within the discretion of the legislature. 
§14.l2. 1 Acts of 1924, c. 488, as amended. 
2 Acts of 1956, c. 665. As of September 15, 1958, the mayor had nominated the 
commissioners for the zoning commission created under the new act, but the city 
council had not yet acted on the nominations. The 1956 act will not completely 
replace the 1924 act until the zoning commission has prepared a zoning plan for 
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1956 zoning law for Boston, the most important change being an in-
crease in the membe:rship of the zoning commission, which will replace 
the board of zoning adjustment under the 1924 law.s Eleven, instead 
of nine, commissioners are now authorized, the additional two com-
missioners being selected at large by the mayor. Of the new total of 
three commissioners appointed at large by the mayor, at least one must 
own, alone or with others, and must occupy in whole or part as his 
residence a dwelling house having three or less dwelling units. The 
amendment also requires the mayor's appointments of all commis-
sioners be confirmed by the city council. The 1956 act provided that 
any person, whether or not a resident of the city of Boston, who was a 
member of the board of zoning adjustment under the 1924 act, could 
act as a zoning commissioner, although generally commissioners must 
be residents of Boston. Because of the delay in the acceptance of the 
act by the city council of Boston, the 1958 amendments have made 
this provision applicable to members of the board who are members 
at the time of acceptance rather than passage of the 1956 act. Pro-
vision is also made to stagger the terms of the three commissioners that 
are appointed at large by the mayor, and all terms of commissioners 
will commence as of May I, 1958. 
Because of the increase in total number of commissioners, certain 
provisions relating to the number of commissioners who must act have 
been changed by the 1958 amendments. At least six commissioners 
are required for a quorum at a public hearing on zoning regulations.4 
Zoning regulations may be adopted, amended or repealed by a con-
curring vote of at least seven commissioners. The mayor has the right 
to veto these changes, and the concurring vote of at least nine com-
missioners is required to override his veto.5 
Legislators have become increasingly aware that land use planning 
should properly consider factors other than those of a direct economic 
nature.6 Massachusetts has recently enacted several statutes designed 
to preserve historic landmarks and areas, and to prevent the demolition 
of buildings and exterior alterations that would not be appropriate 
to the character of the district.7 The Supreme Judicial Court has held 
in advisory opinions that these historic district statutes are well within 
the police power of the Commonwealth.8 
the city. which will not take effect until twelve months have passed after filing of 
this new zoning plan with the General Court. 
3 Acts of 1924. c. 488. §20, as amended. 
4 Acts of 1958. c. 77. §2. 
1\ The mayor's power to appoint at large three commissioners out of the total of 
eleven, along with the number required to override a veto, gives the mayor con-
siderable power in preventing changes in the zoning law that he considers unwise 
or inappropriate. 
6 See, e.g., the provision in the new Boston zoning statute, Acts of 1956, c. 665, §2, 
which lists as one of the criteria for change, amendment and repeal of zoning regu-
lations the preservation and increasing of amenities of land in the city. 
7 See, e.g., Acts of 1955, c. 601 (Nantucket); id., c. 616 (Beacon Hill in Boston); Acts 
of 1956, c. 447 (Lexington). 
8 Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955); Opinion of the 
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Several amendments to Acts of 1955, c. 616, creating the Historic 
Beacon Hill District of Boston, were adopted during the 1958 SURVEY 
year. The area covered by the district was increased.9 Provisions re-
lating to the issue of permits, demolition of buildings, and enforcement 
have been altered and the act now covers as an additional requirement 
on landowners that the exterior color of a building not be changed 
without a permit.10 Acts of 1956, c. 477, setting up an Historic Dis-
tricts Commission in the town of Lexington, was amended by Acts of 
1958, c. 185. The amendments change the method of selection of 
alternate members of the commission, make certain procedural changes, 
and permit the color of any building in the historic districts to be 
changed to white without the necessity of obtaining a permit. 
§14.13. Housing Authority Law. Acts of 1957, c. 613, redefined 
"blighted open area" in the Housing Authority Law1 to include recre-
ational, commercial and industrial purposes, as well as the predomi-
. ,nately residential purposes that were only permitted previously.2 Acts 
of 1958, c. 198, corrected the definition of "land assembly and redevel-
opment projects" 3 so as to include these additional purposes in ref-
erence to action the project may take in relation to "blighted open 
areas." 
Acts of 1958, c. 199, provides authority for appropriations by cities 
and towns having a redevelopment authority for the initial costs and 
annual administrative expenses of the authority.4 Annual amounts 
that can be appropriated are limited on a scale based on valuations in 
the city or town. Authority is given, however, to appropriate addi-
tional amounts for estimates, plans, orders of taking and contract docu-
ments in connection with land assembly and redevelopment projects 
and urban renewal projects, with a provision that the city or town 
shall be reimbursed if the authority later receives money from other 
sources for these purposes. 
§14.14. Agricultural1and use. Resolves of 1958, c. 99, revives and 
continues the special commission studying the use and preservation of 
agricultural land in the Commonwealth. 1 Although Massachusetts 
is not primarily a farm state and has only a small amount of relatively 
poor land devoted to farming, an imaginative approach by this com-
mission could do much to improve and develop farm land use. A close 
study of the type of farm operations that will be most successful in 
the state now and in the future, and land use and zoning plans effec-
Justices, 333 Mass. 783, 128 N.E.2d 563 (1955). These opinions are commented on in 
1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.6. 
9 Acts of 1958, c. 315. 
10 Id., c. 314. 
§14.l3. 1 G.L., c. 121, §§261-26CCC. 
2 See 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §29.4. 
3 G.L., c. 121, §26J. 
4 The act adds a new paragraph to id. §26QQ. 
§14.l4. 1 The commission was originally created by Resolves of 1957, c. 76. 
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tuating these determinations, will markedly aid the farm economy and 
with it the entire economy of the Commonwealth. 
§14.15. Explosives on property: Removal of hazardous conditions. 
General Laws, c. 148, §13, provides for the licensing of land by local 
licensing authorities for use of structures thereon for the storage, keep-
ing, manufacture or sale of explosives and inflammables.1 Acts of 
1958, c. 251, amended this section to add a requirement that, within 
three weeks from the time the property is no longer being used for the 
licensed purpose, the licensee remove any hazardous condition incident 
to cessation of the use. Provision is made that, on failure of the 
holder of the license to act, the city or town can remove the hazardous 
conditions, charging the holder of the license for its work, and the 
statement of claim, when properly registered, becomes a lien on the 
land if the claim is not paid. 
§14.16. Signs and structures projecting over public ways. General 
Laws, c. 85, §8, gives municipal authorities having charge of public 
ways the power to grant permits for signs, clocks, permanent awnings 
and other similar structures that project into or are placed over or on 
public ways. Section 9 has exempted certain of these structures from 
permit requirements, provided that they do not extend into or over 
the public way more than six inches.1 Acts of 1958, c. 158, has 
amended this exemption section to increase to twelve inches the dis-
tance of extension into or over the public way. 
§14.l5. 1 The types of explosives and infiammables covered by the licensing pro-
vision are listed in G_L, c_ 148, §9_ 
§14.16. 1 Section 9 also exempts poles, wires, conduits and appurtenances of 
various public utilities from the permit requirement. 
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